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Abstract
The ability to accurately detect and filter offensive con-
tent automatically is important to ensure a rich and
diverse digital discourse. Trolling is a type of hurtful
or offensive content that is prevalent in social media,
but is underrepresented in datasets for offensive con-
tent detection. In this work, we present a dataset that
models trolling as a subcategory of offensive content.
The dataset was created by collecting samples from
well-known datasets and reannotating them along pre-
cise definitions of different categories of offensive con-
tent. The dataset has 12,490 samples, split across 5
classes; Normal, Profanity, Trolling, Derogatory and
Hate Speech. It encompasses content from Twitter, Red-
dit and Wikipedia Talk Pages. Models trained on our
dataset show appreciable performance without any sig-
nificant hyperparameter tuning and can potentially learn
meaningful linguistic information effectively. We find
that these models are sensitive to data ablation which
suggests that the dataset is largely devoid of spuri-
ous statistical artefacts that could otherwise distract and
confuse classification models.1
1 Introduction
“Fuck you, Smith. Please have me notified when you die. I
want to dance on your grave”. Superficially, this message
expresses glee at a person’s death and thus could cause dis-
tress. However, the undercurrent of humour in the message
is undeniable - it’s highly likely that the message is figura-
tive and is meant to be perhaps slightly mean. In essence,
this message constitutes Trolling2 - a type of social interac-
tion on the internet that is widespread enough to have en-
tered the general lexicon. Our analysis of popular, publicly
available datasets of offensive content (Zampieri et al. 2019;
Davidson et al. 2017; Founta et al. 2018; Salminen et
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al. 2018) reveals that they largely ignore the existence of
trolling; utilizing labelling schemes that are either too coarse
to properly distinguish between the different kinds of offen-
sive content; or too finely focused on subcategories of hate
speech (ElSherief et al. 2018). Founta et al. is the excep-
tion, however, it also ignores the existence of trolling content
(Founta et al. 2018).
Content that is hateful, oppressive, insulting and obscene
can have far-flung repercussions, particularly when ampli-
fied through an echo chamber of isolation (Barber et al.
2015). Organizations that own these social media platforms
are thus engaged in a balancing act between curtailing free
speech and removing bad actors. This makes the identifi-
cation and filtering of offensive content from social media
critically important. To do this, most platforms currently em-
ploy some sort of algorithmic filtering backed by manual re-
view. However, the volume of data generated, in conjunction
with diverse user demographics makes this task very diffi-
cult3. People interact in a variety of ways; similar phrases
can mean drastically different things depending upon the
cultural and societal context. Finally, social media websites
pose a challenge for automated filtering and nlp techniques
due to their idiosyncratic language, unusual structure and
ambiguous representation of discourse. Information extrac-
tion methods also often give poor results when applied in
such settings (Ritter et al. 2011).
Though a substantial effort has been made to solve of-
fensive content detection(Fortuna and Nunes 2018); terms
like trolling, hate speech, profanity and cyberbullying are
often overloaded or used interchangeably, causing ambigu-
ity and limiting the efficacy of classification models. Ambi-
guity translates to problematic scenarios in the real world;
groups or individuals that indulge in trolling behaviour are
occasionally considered proponents of hate speech and de-
platformed. This sort of inadvertent censorship has negative
repercussions — not only does it help shape a narrow, intol-
erant public discourse, but also these censored groups and
individuals often develop a feeling of persecution and alien-
ation (Rogers 2020).4
3https://www.forbes.com/sites/fruzsinaeordogh/2019/03/11/
twitters-anti-harassment-tools-reviewed/#739f65d91e13
4Jack Dorsey, Vijaya Gadda, Tim Pool & Joe Rogan.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZCBRHOg3PQ
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Table 1: Definition of classes and examples.
Class name Definition of class Examples
Normal Any sample which does not troll, mock, insultor threaten either an individual or a group. “Coroner was a good career choice”
Profanity Samples that contain profane words that are notdirected towards a particular individual or group. “What a fucking awful day”
Trolling Content intended to cause disruption, triggerconflict or insult for amusement.
“Your body fat is as evenly distributed as the wealth
in the US economy”
Derogatory
Insults and offensive content that is offensive and
directed to any group or individual, but does not
either constitute a direct threat or does not express
hatred towards that individual or group.
“FUCKYOU U MATHRFUKER BITCH
IDIOOOOT NO BAN MEFROM EDIT I
TELL TRUTH”
Hate Speech An expression of hatred towards individuals orgroups on the grounds of their identity. “Im going to start killing these assholes. Chin chin”
The differences between trolling and hate speech can be
subtle (Bjrkelo 2014) and often depend only upon degrees
of sarcasm or aggression present in the text. Further, given
the dichotomy between the relatively light-hearted nature of
trolling and the extreme nature of hate speech, a gamut of
sexist, racist, homophobic and otherwise offensive content
exists that doesn’t constitute extreme hate or direct threats.
The social sciences have very well demarcated definitions
for trolling, offensive content and hate speech (Hardaker
2010; Bjrkelo 2014) which suggest that categories of offen-
sive content can be demarcated based upon the severity or
extremity of offence. To this end, the main contributions of
this work are as follows:
• To provide a publically available dataset5 of offensive
content, with 12,490 samples, split across five classes -
Normal, Profanity, Trolling, Derogatory and Hate Speech.
Table 1 relays a brief explanation of our classes which
have been further elaborated upon in Section 4. To our
knowledge, this dataset is the first work that provides
a manually labelled corpus that distinguishes between
trolling and hate speech.
• The data is sourced by reannotating samples from previ-
ously released public datasets (Founta et al. 2018; David-
son et al. 2017; Holgate et al. 2018; Gautam et al. 2019)
and thus contains tweets, comments from Wikipedia talk
pages and Reddit posts. A diverse set of data sources re-
duces the potential presence of spurious statistical arte-
facts that could otherwise confuse and distract models.
Section 3 give more details about the distribution of sam-
ples from various platforms.
• To verify the absence of statistical artifacts via metrics
introduced in (Niven and Kao 2019) (Applicability, Pro-
ductivity, Coverage and Strength) and data ablation tech-
niques (Heinzerling 2019).
BERT (Devlin et al. 2018) with default parameters achieves
75.3% classification accuracy and 0.73 F1 score on our pro-
posed dataset. The model also experiences an average drop
of 0.27 on the F1 score when subjected to significant data
ablation. This sensitivity indicates that our dataset is largely
5https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3828501
devoid of spurious statistical artefacts and can potentially
lead to learning more robust models overall.
2 Related Work
The study of offensive content in social media broadly fol-
lows three major directions of inquiry - detection, psy-
chological implications (Craker and March 2016; Suler
2004), and human behaviour (Buckels, Trapnell, and Paul-
hus 2014). Our work is mainly concerned with detection that
can be further categorized into three broad categories. the
problem definition, based on how precisely offensive content
is defined; the granularity of classes, indicating the differ-
ent categories of offensive speech; and the feature modali-
ties, depending on the data modalities used as input features
for classification models. Most early works in this domain
are characterized by broad, all-encompassing definitions of
offensive content, binary categorization of offensive or not,
and single modalities — either text, images, video, meta-
data, or networks. More recent work can be characterized by
more precise definitions; fine-grained classification of hate
speech categories and multiple modalities.
Early researchers formulated the problem as a binary clas-
sification task, with definitions of offensive content and its
sub-categories being largely ambiguous. Terms with subtle
distinctions like hate speech and cyberbullying were used
interchangeably. Datasets were collected from social media
platforms by searching for a limited number of handcrafted
terms. Popular feature sets included token or character-level
n-grams (Van Hee et al. 2015), sentence/document lengths
(Dadvar, Trieschnigg, and De Jong 2014), capitalization
(Nobata et al. 2016; Watanabe, Bouazizi, and Ohtsuki 2018),
and document level sentiments (Chatzakou et al. 2017).
More recently, neural embeddings (Mojica and Ng 2018;
Ribeiro et al. 2018; Zhang, Robinson, and Tepper 2018),
have replaced the hand-engineered feature sets.
Colloquial and informal content produced in different so-
cial media channels pose challenges as discussed in Sec-
tion 1. To tackle these, researchers began using combina-
tions of modalities. Studies in this vein started experiment-
ing with user and post-level metadata along with textual
features, age of the account (Al-garadi, Varathan, and Ra-
vana 2016), the number of followers/followees (Zhong et al.
2016), presence of profanity in the username (Chatzakou et
al. 2017), and the presence of offensive terms in previous
posts (Chen et al. 2012; Dadvar et al. 2013). Researchers
have also started looking at multimodal user-generated con-
tent (Zhong et al. 2016; Singh, Ghosh, and Jose 2017;
Hosseinmardi et al. 2015). Dinakar et al. used knowledge
graphs for detecting subtle and sarcastic trolling attempts
(Dinakar et al. 2012). Potha and Maragoudakis modelled
the problem as a time series prediction problem (Potha
and Maragoudakis 2014). Cheng et al. developed multi-
modal graph representations combining content, user data
and metadata information (Cheng et al. 2019).
Recently, as meta-studies uncover major gaps in problem
definition and granularity of class axes, research has started
to expand in these directions (Fortuna and Nunes 2018;
Schmidt and Wiegand 2017). Davidson et al. proposed that
abusive words can sometimes be used in a casual and in-
offensive manner, different from hate speech (Davidson et
al. 2017). To this end, they proposed a dataset with three
classes: Hate Speech, Abusive and Neither. Davidson et al.
also presented an extended version of the study discussing
potential racial bias in offensive content datasets (David-
son, Bhattacharya, and Weber 2019). Founta et al. proposed
guidelines to create large offensive content datasets using
crowdsourced workers (Founta et al. 2018), and (Malmasi
and Zampieri 2018) conducted a set of experiments in a sim-
ilar vein on a different dataset. Salminen et al. developed a
highly granular taxonomy of different kinds of hate speech
(Salminen et al. 2018). It’s relevant to mention that (Mo-
jica and Ng 2018) released an annotated corpus of trolling
content, however the authors’ intention was to attempt to
model the poster’s intentions and the affects on the recip-
ient, and thus the messages are not guaranteed to contain
trolling content. Further, the corpus is no longer publically
available. Each of these studies demonstrated granularity of
classes and precise definitions.
As the problems of hate speech and offensive content in
social media grew in popularity - shared tasks and datasets
began to be formed. The most notable of these are Track-1
of COLING 2018 (Kumar et al. 2018), HatEval (Basile et
al. 2019) which sacrifices granularity in favour of multiple
languages and OffensEval (Zampieri et al. 2019) which at-
tempts to identify whether offensive content is targeted or
not. These datasets also pose the detection of offensive con-
tent as a binary classification problem.
Our work explores granular classes from a different an-
gle, distinguishing between offensive content based upon the
severity of offense. Our dataset is best categorized as having
precise definitions for offensive content, having moderate
granularity and using a singular modality of textual content.
3 Data Sources
To annotate offensive content, annotators typically need to
winnow through a large number of innocuous samples to
find a significant amount of offensive content. To this end,
we collect data by relabelling randomly selected samples
from publicly available datasets; (Davidson et al. 2017),
(Founta et al. 2018), The Kaggle Jigsaw Toxic Comments6,
(Holgate et al. 2018) and (Gautam et al. 2019). For the rest
of this work, we refer to them as Davidson, Crowdsource,
Jigsaw, Why Swear and #MeToo, respectively.
Davidson collected a set of 24,000 tweets and labelled
them as hate speech, offensive language or neither. Their
definition of hate speech is quite broad relative to ours, as
they include all language that is intended to humiliate or
derogatory towards an individual or group. They further re-
port that classifiers as well as human annotators tend to con-
fuse their hate speech and offensive language classes. They
conclude that future work needs to consider social context in
the task of hate speech detection and ensure that hate speech
categories do not only contain multiple extreme slurs.
Crowdsource is a set of 100,000 tweets labelled as abu-
sive, normal, hateful and spam. The authors use a similar
definition of hate speech as Davidson. However they find
that an annotation scheme that distinguishes between sub
categories of abusive and hateful content is unsuitable for
large scale crowd annotation.
Jigsaw is a set of 300,000 comments from Wikipedia Talk
Pages that are annotated for six classes: toxic, severe toxic,
insult, obscene, threat and identity hate. It was originally
used for a toxic comment detection challenge on Kaggle.
Davidson, Crowdsource and Jigsaw are three very pop-
ular datasets that deal with hate speech and offensive co-
tent and are thus good potential sources of data. Why Swear
seeks to analyse the role that vulgar words play in the de-
tection of offensive content. Since previous work has shown
that the task of offensive content detection can be biased to-
wards the presence of offensive words, using Why Swear as
a source corpus meant a reasonable chance of having sam-
ples/phrases with vulgar words used in non-offensive con-
text and potentially, a less biased dataset.
MeToo represents a corpus of text that has been annotated
for hate speech, relevance and sarcasm - which are important
factors in our own annotation system. Further, the dialogue
or content in these samples is likely to be focused around
sexism which may not have been reflected in the Jigsaw data.
In addition to sampling previously related datasets, we
augment the data with a thousand samples from the RoastMe
Subreddit7 as the forum tends to focus insults on appearance
which might have been underrepresented in other platforms.
Collectively, our data contains samples from Twitter, Talk
Pages of Wikipedia articles and Reddit. Figure 1 shows the
distributions of annotated classes from each source dataset.
4 Class Definitions
Offensive content runs the gamut between casual pejora-
tives, slurs, and threats of violence. Combining the different
kinds of offensive content into a single bucket is thus inap-
propriate. Our dataset attempts to differentiate based upon
the degree of offence by labelling samples into five classes:
Normal, Profanity, Trolling, Derogatory and Hate Speech
with each of them defined as:
6https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-
classification-challenge
7https://www.reddit.com/r/RoastMe/
Figure 1: Distribution of classes by source. #MeToo is over-
whelmingly Normal, and Jigsaw contributes the lion’s share
of Trolling and Hate Speech.
• Normal: Any sample which does not troll, mock, insult
or threaten either an individual or a group. Examples are
“Coroner was a good career choice” and “The persecu-
tion of gay people must be stopped”.
• Profanity: Content that contains profane words that are
not directed towards a particular individual or group. For
example, “What a fucking awful day”.
• Trolling: Content intended to cause disruption, trigger
conflict or insult for amusement. Users who participate
or conduct trolling are called trolls (Hardaker 2010). For
example, “You look like the generic gay hipster that has
too high of an ego”.
• Derogatory: Insults and messages that are offensive and
directed to any group or individual, but do not constitute
a direct threat or express hatred towards that individual
or group, e.g., “O FUCK YOU U MATHRFUKER BITCH
IDIOOOOT NO BAN ME FROM EDIT I TELL TRUTH”.
• Hate Speech: An expression of hatred towards individu-
als or groups on the grounds of their identity - political
stance, religious belief, race and ethnicity, national origin
or sexual orientation (Bjrkelo 2014). Examples are “you
accuse me of vandalism, i’ll vandalize yo face, nigga” and
“I’m going to start killing these assholes. Chin chin.”
A pertinent point of distinction between hate speech and
trolling is the presence of viciousness or aggression. Hate
speech samples are significantly violent or extremely offen-
sive. For example, the comparison of the phrases “you’re
so gay” and “every gay boy deserves to be slaughtered” re-
veals the latter to be significantly more vicious. Thus the for-
mer is considered trolling and the latter, hate speech despite
their both using the word “gay” in the same context. Sim-
ilarly, the point of distinction between derogatory, trolling
and hate speech is in the aggression displayed or the ter-
minology used. The phrase “Stop acting like a fag” is too
offensive to be trolling because of the word choice. Despite
being homophobic, it does not necessarily express hatred to-
wards homosexuals and thus belongs in the derogatory class.
On the other hand, phrases like “all gults should get cancer”
is classified as hate speech even though the phrase “gult” is
a relatively inoffensive slur.
5 Annotation Process and Guidelines
The data was annotated independently by a PhD student and
two research assistants, each of whom were intimately fa-
miliar with this domain. They were instructed to be wary of
seemingly innocuous samples that could contain words or
phrases considered offensive in other cultures. Further, they
were advised to make a decision keeping the entire sam-
ple in mind, rather than the presence of highly offensive
words. In the initial draw, a random set of 2,000 samples
was picked from each parent dataset8 and annotated. Post a
preliminary stage of annotation, a second set of 2,000 sam-
ples was picked from Jigsaw’s Obscene, Toxic and Severely
Toxic classes, in order to boost derogatory and hate speech
samples. Once all the samples were annotated, duplicate
rows, blank rows and samples containing other languages
were removed, resulting in slightly less than 13,000 sam-
ples. Of these, the annotators could not agree on 495 sam-
ples which were also removed, making the final dataset size
12,490 samples. The annotation guidelines are as follows.
5.1 Profanity Detection
Content with the presence of vulgarity, profanity or
swear/curse which is not directed to an individual or a group.
The following are examples of profanity:
1. “What the fuck is wrong with this day? Can it get any
worse?” - The profane word “fuck” is not directed as an
insult towards any individual or group. Thus, the profanity
class is appropriate.
2. The phrase “my nigga” in “This ghetto is full of my
nigga”, is loosely equivalent to “my friends”. The con-
text is somewhat ambiguous, but the word “nigga” is not
being used in a derogatory fashion or victimizing a partic-
ular individual or group. So, profanity is appropriate here.
5.2 Trolling Detection
Content intended to cause disruption, trigger conflict or mild
insults for amusement. It may have a sense of humour, sar-
casm or mockery. It can be directed to a group of people or
an individual. The following are the examples of trolling:
1. “Your body fat is as evenly distributed as the wealth in the
US economy”. This message contains no profane words,
mocks an individual and is not an expression of hatred or
extreme insult. Thus trolling.
2. “Fuck you Fuck you Fuck you Fuck you ... Fuck you” The
word “Fuck” is directed towards a particular individual or
group; thus it cannot be profanity. Continuous repetition,
without any further context, suggests that the message is
intended to be disruptive, rather than express hatred or
insult. Thus the hate speech and derogatory classes are
inappropriate, and the message should be labelled trolling.
8including 1000 samples from RoastMe
3. “3 MOST COMMON WHITE PEOPLE ACTIVITIES: 1.
Wearing Tapout, 2. Shooting up schools,3. Calling you
a nigger on Xbox-” The message quite obviously is di-
rected towards white people; thus profanity is not suitable.
The very offensive word “nigger” makes the derogatory
or hate speech classes very tempting, however, since the
overall message is intended as a mockery of white people,
trolling is the most appropriate.
4. “My grandma used to call me a porch monkey all the
time... Come to think of it she did refer to a broken bot-
tle as a nigger knife.” This sample contains a large num-
ber of racist remarks and is quite offensive. However, in
this particular case, the comment is a reference to a scene
from a movie that is a somewhat popular meme, and thus
this message is most likely trolling.
5.3 Derogatory Content Detection
A harsh, serious insult that is hurtful and derogatory to an in-
dividual or a community. These are the comments which are
too severe to be considered trolling and yet do not express
hate. The following are examples of offensive content:
1. “All muslims are gay”. In this message, even though the
word “gay” is not profane or offensive in of itself, it is be-
ing used as a pejorative for Muslims; thus, the derogatory
class is appropriate.
2. “Guys are not supposed to get their ass sucked queer!”
In context, the otherwise innocuous word “queer” is as-
sumed to be an insult. Despite an attempt at juvenile hu-
mour, the message is quite offensive and belongs in the
derogatory class.
5.4 Hate Speech Detection
Extremely violent or offensive content, as well as identity-
based hate. Threats of violence towards a person or group
of people based on their religious beliefs, ethnicity, race,
disability, gender, sexual orientation or political inclination.
Some examples of hate speech are as follows:
1. “White Trash Fuck off you white piece of trash. Fucking
wiggers. Go and fuck a Jew, Jew raper.” This sample is of-
fensive and expresses hatred towards white people. Quite
simply, hate speech.
2. “I’ll kick the shit out of you ya cunt” This sample is a
threat of violence, potentially to a woman. Undoubtedly
hate speech.
3. “WHO CARES ABOUT A BUNCH OF DIRTY MON-
KEYS FROM HAITI. MONCRIEF, WHAT ARE YOU A
JEW?.” This sample expresses hatred for people from
Haiti and tries to imply that they are sub-human. For this
reason, hate speech.
The annotator agreement between three annotators was
measured by the Randolph (0.65) and Fleiss Kappa (0.59).
Both these scores are indicative of Moderate Agreement.
Fig. 2 shows the most confused classes between the three an-
notators. The class with majority agreement is plotted on the
Y-axis, and the third annotator’s decision is on the X-axis.
Table 2: Class distribution in our Dataset. Severity of offen-
sive and number of samples are inversely proportional.
Class # of Samples
Normal 5,053
Trolling 4,537
Profanity 1,582
Derogatory 862
Hate Speech 456
We observe that trolling and derogatory classes are most fre-
quently confused; of the derogatory class, 50% of the sam-
ples have a disagreeing annotator believe that they should
have been marked trolling. Similarly, for the hate speech
class, roughly 36% of the samples had a dissenting anno-
tator believe that they should have been marked as deroga-
tory. We believe this reflects the subjective nature of offen-
sive content. The confusion between trolling and profanity
is incongruous, as the class definitions are quite distinct.
Figure 2: Confusion matrix between majority agreement la-
bel and minority annotator. 52% of the derogatory samples
had one out of three annotators believe it should be trolling.
6 Dataset and Metadata Analysis
The dataset has 12,490 Samples, split across five classes.
The distribution of classes in the dataset is in Table 2. Fig-
ure 1 lists the distribution of samples mined from each
source. These sources include data from different social me-
dia platforms. Figure 3 shows the change of the samples
from each original class in their respective datasets and new
actual annotation classes. A point of interest is that sam-
ples from virtually every label of the source datasets have
been mapped to trolling. Figure 4 lists the distribution of
samples from each platform. Despite the large majority of
the data coming from Twitter, a third of the total samples
come from Wikipedia Talk Pages.
Collectively, we observe a decrease in the number of sam-
ples as the severity of offensive content increases. This is
to be expected. A large proportion of samples taken from
Figure 3: Class change from source datasets to ours. Jigsaw and MeToo were originally multi-label which skews this figure
slightly.
Crowdsource are assigned the normal class. Since Crowd-
source is imbalanced and close to 60% of the source data
is Normal, this is also expected. Surprisingly, MeeToo sam-
ples are also disproportionately biased towards the normal
class. On inspection, the majority of MeeToo samples are
either accusations of harassment or discussion around vari-
ous allegations and do not constitute threats or insults which
explains this discrepancy. Jigsaw supplies a large amount of
the hate speech in our dataset, largely because of the second
round of annotations that was carried out only with samples
from Jigsaw’s more offensive classes. Finally, Why Swear
provides the lion’s share of the profanity class.
To help identify edge cases and points of failure, we
examine the distribution of the type of offensive content
present in the data. We use the vocabulary from Hate-
base.org9 to assign each sample to one or more categories.
The percentages of each category are presented in Table 3.
Samples of hate speech present in our dataset are dominated
by insults directed at people’s gender and sexual orientation.
The fact that hate speech has a more significant proportion
of these slurs is to be expected - though this necessitates ex-
amining these terms as potential cues for models trained on
our data to learn instead of learning from the overall context
of the samples.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the mean scores for LIWC cate-
gories across all the classes of our dataset. Much has already
been said in literature about LIWC categories (ElSherief et
al. 2018; Pennebaker et al. 2015) However, a few interest-
9https://hatebase.org/
Figure 4: Class distribution by platform. Twitter contributes
the most samples overall, though most trolling comes from
Wikipedia.
Table 3: Percentage of vulgar terms type by label. Gender
and Orientation are represented more than other types.
Abuse Type Normal Profanity Trolling Derogatory HateSpeech
Orientation 0.3 0.70 2.49 15.31 15.79
Gender 2.97 8.91 19.97 35.85 20.17
Disability 0.40 0.44 4.74 4.88 5.48
Ethnicity 8.97 3.22 5.64 8.93 10.31
Nationality 4.06 0.50 0.66 0.93 1.53
Religion 0.91 0.06 0.13 0.12 1.09
Class 0.43 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.0
ing observations emerge in the analysis. The Personal Con-
cern Death is dominated by the hate speech class, which is
due to direct threats being categorized as hate speech. The
high representation of the sexual personal concern across
most classes is likely due to the frequency of vulgar words
like “fuck” across 4 of the 5 categories. A somewhat unex-
pected outcome is that derogatory has a greater percentage
of anger than hate speech since hate speech should contain
more anger or be more extreme in terms of offense or anger.
The profanity class has “I” as the most common personal
pronoun, by a small margin. The personal pronoun “you” is
a lot more common in hate speech and derogatory because
of directed insult and abuse in those classes.
7 Dataset Quality Analysis
Studies on the composition of text datasets have shown that
state-of-the-art models can “short” and fit on distributions
of tokens rather than gain some understanding of language
(Niven and Kao 2019). Models trained on datasets with
a large proportion of very effective cues could potentially
learn to associate cues with specific labels and disregard any
linguistic information. We evaluate our dataset on these met-
rics to determine potential cues. Dataset ablations help ver-
ify their accuracy.
7.1 Classification Models
Data Preprocessing - Text is preprocessed using the fast.ai
Tokenizer10 and follows its conventions. Token “xxup” is in-
serted right before capitalised words, token “xxmaj” is in-
serted before words in title case. Repeated words and char-
acters are further removed after placing appropriate mark-
ing tokens. The data is anonymised - any personally iden-
tifiable information like Twitter username and IP address
are removed, and hashtags are converted into regular words.
We remove special characters and XML Tags and also, re-
place URLs with the token “xxurl”. Tokenisation for BERT
is done using BERT fulltokenizer11. The samples are then
divided into an 80-20 training and validation split.
Three different models, a character CNN (Zhang, Zhao,
and LeCun 2015), a sentence-level CNN (Kim 2014) with
Fasttext embeddings and BERT-base-cased (Devlin et al.
2018) are trained. The best performing model is selected
for the calculation of Productivity and tested for sensitivity
to data ablation. No major hyperparameter optimization is
done, and yet all three models perform very well out of the
box. Table 4 shows the model performance on the validation
set.
The focus of this work is not on the classifiers, however
for an in-depth view of all preprocessing steps and classifier
hyperparameters (see the attached code).12
7.2 Post Length Cue
One of the benefits of the data being sourced from multiple
platforms is the potential for models trained on the data to
10https://docs.fast.ai/text.transform.html#Tokenization
11https://github.com/google-research/bert/blob/master/
tokenization.py
12Inserted after acceptance.
Table 4: Model performance on our dataset.
Model Accuracy Weighted F1Score
Naive Bayes 64.4% 0.57
Character CNN 68.3% 0.65
N-gram CNN 70.4% 0.68
BERT 75.3% 0.73
learn how to detect offensive content in a more generalised
fashion. However, a disadvantage is that each platform has
a different idiomatic style of messages that is unique to that
platform. For example, conversations on Twitter tend to have
short messages, with threads being used to convey long-form
ideas. Thus the length distribution of samples across labels
is important - otherwise, models could potentially treat the
length of the input sample as a cue for that class. Figure 6
shows the length distribution of each class and shows that the
class lengths are similarly distributed, with very few sam-
ples in normal, trolling and hate speech being significantly
longer.
7.3 N-gram Cues
Unigram, bigram, and trigram sized tokens of each sample
are extracted and evaluated based on the following metrics.
Applicability: Given a token unique to a single class, the
Applicability of the token is the count of data samples which
contain that token. Mathematically, the Applicability for a
token k is defined in Eq. 1. Intuitively, this metric speaks to
potential cues for the model to associate with that class.
αk =
n∑
i=1
1
[
∃j, k ∈ T(i)j ∧ k /∈ T(i)¬j
]
(1)
Here, T(i)j is set of all tokens in subset for data point i
with label j.
Productivity: Given a token unique to a single class, the
Productivity of the token is the proportion of data samples
for which the model predicts the correct answer, relative to
the Applicability of the token. Therefore, the Productivity of
a token is a metric for how useful the model would find it to
be. Productivity pik can be calculated as defined in Eq. 2.
pik =
∑n
i=1 1
[
∃j, k ∈ T(i)j ∧ k /∈ T(i)¬j ∧ yi = j
]
αk
(2)
Coverage - Coverage is simply the proportion of Applica-
bility relative to the total number of rows in the dataset.
Ck =
αk
n
(3)
Strength - The strength of a cue is defined as the product of
its Coverage and Productivity.
Sk = Ck × pik (4)
We extract cues from our dataset and calculate its Produc-
tivity, Coverage and Strength. Cues with non zero Applica-
bility (Eq. 1) or Coverage (Eq. 3) primarily serve as charac-
teristic cues for each label. For all three datasets, the large
(a) Summary (b) Psychological Processes (c) Person Pronouns
(d) Negative Emotions (e) Temporal Focus (f) Personal Concerns
Figure 5: Mean scores for LIWC categories. The data is dominated by samples that use present tense, and display anger, as
expected of such a corpus. characteristic differences exist between classes which are in line with our definitions. For example,
(c) derogatory focuses on the pronoun “you” but profanity uses “I”. (f) hate speech displays a high percentage of death content
(expected due to it’s extreme and hurtful nature)
(a) Normal (b) Profanity
(c) Trolling (d) Derogatory
(e) Hate Speech
Figure 6: Sample length distribution for each class. Majority
of distribution for all classes follows a similar distribution;
this reduces the potential for a model to associate a label
with sample length.
proportion of cues show an inverse relationship between
Productivity and Coverage, this would imply that most cues
are either widespread (high Applicability) or very profitable
for the model to learn (high Productivity). Further, the Ap-
plicability of the strongest cues is quite low - this means that
the majority of these cues are cues because they occur in
single-digit samples of one class throughout the dataset.
Table 6 shows the top 5 cues for both the training and val-
idation sets. Both, the strongest cues for the normal, trolling
and profanity classes seem to be fairly random. This is a
little surprising since intuitively one would expect the pro-
fanity class to be characterised by profane words. However,
given the nature of profane words, it is unlikely for insults to
be restricted to profanity, without also showing up in either
derogatory or hate speech, if not both. It stands to reason
that unigrams will generally be significantly stronger than
bigrams or trigrams since unigrams will occur more fre-
quently, increasing their Coverage and Productivity. Cues
for derogatory and hate speech definitely include profane
words, and this is a cause for concern. However, the cues
for these classes are not unigram cues. bigram or trigram
cues will have lower Applicability and Coverage as it is less
likely for longer sequences to repeat themselves in the cor-
pus.
7.4 Data Ablation
Cues across labels can distract models from learning con-
text or meaningful information from data. We perform data
ablation tests proposed by (Heinzerling 2019). In principle,
models should be susceptible to significant dataset ablations
- as the dataset is transformed dramatically, model perfor-
mance should drop precipitously.
Table 5: BERT ablation study results.
Ablation Technique Accuracy Weighted F1Score
No Ablation 75.3% 0.73
Shuffling Labels 40.2% (-35.1%) 0.23 (-0.50)
Scrambling Words 62.4% (-12.8%) 0.58 (-0.15)
Removing Words 60.8% (-14.4%) 0.56 (-0.17)
Scramble Word Order: The tokens or words for each sam-
ple in the test set are randomly shuffled. A drop in test set
accuracy indicates that the model depends upon the sequen-
tial nature of words/cues to at least some extent. If the test
set performance does not change significantly, this could in-
dicate that the model has effectively learned a bag-of-words
style classification.
Shuffle Labels: The class labels are randomly shuffled, and
the model is retrained. If test set performance does not
change significantly, this indicates that the model has not
learned to associate contextual cues with each label. This is
the only ablation test that involves model retraining instead
of perturbing inputs of the previously trained model.
Partial Input: Tokens from the samples are removed with a
probability of 0.5, but the sequential order of the remaining
tokens is not disturbed. If test set performance does not drop,
this indicates that the model depends upon a subset of tokens
within each sample to make a prediction.
In general, for a model to be learning linguistic informa-
tion from the dataset, we would expect: (i) data should con-
tain fewer cues of considerable strength and (ii) model per-
formance should drop appreciably with each ablation. Ta-
ble 5 shows the drops in performance for each ablation pro-
cess. the sensitivity of the models to each ablation suggests
that the model depends on the entire message to make pre-
dictions rather than shorting on statistical artefacts.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In conclusion, trolling is a sub-category of offensive con-
tent, that can frequently be mislabelled as either severely
offensive content or hate speech. In order to prevent
overzealous censorship in the name of hate speech re-
moval, it’s important to acknowledge the existence of
trolling. To the best of our knowledge, this dataset is
the first work that distinguishes between trolling and
hate speech in the context of offensive content detec-
tion. The dataset will be publically available via Zenodo
(https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3828501) and encompasses
samples from multiple platforms in social media. Care has
been taken to ensure the dataset is largely devoid of spuri-
ous statistical artefacts and is shown to result in models that
learn sequential cues and potentially linguistic information
instead of just bags of words. The data validation and analy-
sis metrics could also be used in the future as an alternative
method for evaluating datasets in this domain.
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